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Abstract 
The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, I investigate whether numerous debt 
initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s have had a significant effect on economic 
growth rates in developing countries in general. The major initiatives during that 
time period were negotiated as bilateral agreements under the guidance of the 
Paris Club of Creditors. These agreements were complemented later on by the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative in 1996 and its 
“enhanced” version in 1999. I find that, on average, debt relief has no effect on 
growth rates of developing countries. The second question I address in this paper 
is whether the effect on growth rates was different for different subsets of 
developing countries. I find that countries that are not classified as HIPC have 
benefited significantly from debt relief, whereas the growth rates of HIPC 
countries have been unaffected. 
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1  Introduction 
The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, I investigate whether numerous debt initiatives 
during the 1980s and 1990s have had a significant effect on economic growth rates in 
developing countries in general. The major initiatives during that time period were 
negotiated as bilateral agreements under the guidance of the Paris Club of Creditors. These 
agreements were complemented later on by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
debt relief initiative in 1996 and its “enhanced” version in 1999. I find that, on average, debt 
relief has no effect on growth rates of developing countries. The second question I address 
in this paper is whether the effect on growth rates was different for different subsets of 
developing countries. I find that countries that are not classified as HIPC have benefited 
significantly from debt relief, whereas the growth rates of HIPC countries have been 
unaffected. 
After decades of development assistance, researchers have shown a renewed interest in the 
issue of aid effectiveness. This literature focuses on the effects of aid inflows on growth 
rates, as well as determining which economic, political, and institutional factors undermine 
or amplify the effectiveness of development assistance with respect to growth. In my study I 
extend this literature in two ways. First, I explicitly consider the effects of debt relief (which 
can be interpreted as an indirect form of aid) on growth rates in developing countries. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to do so. Second, I compare the effects for 
developing countries that have qualified for the HIPC initiative and developing countries 
that are not part of the initiative. To address these questions, I use two different measures of 
debt relief: the first measure comes from the OECD International Development Statistics 
data set and is called “action related to debt”. This measure is closer to capturing the idea of 
a reduction in net present value of debt stock. The second measure of debt relief is separated 
into debt stock and debt service relief using data from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance data set. I argue that the debt service relief variable can be interpreted 
as working through providing additional (contemporaneous) resources, unlike the OECD 
variable which works through influencing long term incentives for investment decisions. Revised: August 2005 
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Looking at all developing countries together, I find is that debt service relief leaves growth rates 
unaffected independent of whether aid is assumed to have diminishing returns or not. 
Separately examining countries that are classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (for 
short called “HIPCs”) and those that aren’t (“Non-HIPCs”), reveals that growth rates of 
HIPC countries are not affected. For Non-HIPCs, however, the effect on growth rates is 
unambiguous and robustly positive, particularly when diminishing returns to aid are 
assumed. Debt stock relief, on the other hand, has no influence on growth independent of the 
sample used. Using the alternative OECD measure of debt relief, I find that developing 
countries overall have benefited in terms of growth rates. Separately examining the two 
country groups, the results indicate that countries with access to private capital market may 
have suffered in terms of growth by receiving debt relief. This suggests that debt relief may 
have been interpreted as a signal for an unsustainable debt level making access to private 
capital much more difficult. This on the other hand leads to decreasing (private) domestic 
investment and – as a consequence – lower growth. For HIPC countries, however, there is a 
weakly positive relationship between debt relief and growth rates for HIPCs, but for Non-
HIPCs, debt relief has a fairly robust negative effect on growth rates.  
With respect to aid effectiveness – the main concern of the literature –, I find that 
throughout the analysis, aid does not have a robust link with growth. In fact, I hardly find 
any effects of aid on growth at all. This is true whether or not aid goes to a country with a 
good policy environment, thereby questioning the results of the seminal paper by Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) – as several other papers have done. Good policies by themselves, 
however, have positive effects on growth in non-HIPC countries. The policy environment in 
HIPC countries, on the other hand, does not seem to affect growth. I will proceed as 
follows: Section 2 covers some of the related research. In section 3, the estimation strategy is 
described; and section 4 describes the data sources and debt relief variables in detail. The 
estimation results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2  Literature Review 
There is a large and growing literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting 
economic growth. One of the most-cited recent papers in this literature is the Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) paper [henceforth BD], which finds that “aid has a positive impact on growth 
in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, but has little effect in 
the presence of poor policies”. The authors use a new database on foreign aid developed by 
Chang et al. (1999), in which foreign aid is termed effective development assistance. This new 
measure consists of the summation of the grant equivalents of all financial inflows.
1 The 
dependent variable is the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
The explanatory variables in their growth regression are aid as a percentage of GDP, initial 
GDP, ethnic fractionalization, number of assassinations, and interaction term of ethnicity 
and assassinations, the Knack and Keefer (1995) measure of institutional quality, M2/GDP 
to measure financial depth, and a policy index.
2 Their policy index includes the budget 
surplus, the inflation rate, and the Sachs and Werner (1995) dummy measure of trade 
openness. The weights attached to these three components are the coefficient estimates 
determined by running a regression for GDP growth including all the previously mentioned 
explanatory variables except aid; furthermore, the regression constant is added to form the 
index. In addition to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis, they use Two-stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) to control for potential endogeneity of aid. Foreign aid could be endogenous 
because donors may adjust their aid flows to the growth rate of the recipient country either 
by rewarding a fast growing country with additional aid or by helping a slow-growing 
recipient country stimulate growth with additional aid. Their results suggest first, that aid is 
only effective in promoting economic growth in a good policy environment, but not by 
itself; and second, that aid allocation seems to be independent of good policies, at least for 
                                                      
1 As defined by Chang et al. (1999), the “grant equivalent of a financial inflow is the amount that, at the time of its 
commitment, is not expected to be repaid, i.e., the amount subsidized through below-market terms at the time of 
commitment.” (p.5) 
2 Knack and Keefer (1995) define institutional quality by simply summing index measures for the five variables expropriation 
risk, rule of law, repudiation of contracts by government, corruption in government, and quality of bureaucracy from the International 
Country Risk Guide data set. Revised: August 2005 
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bilateral donors. Overall, the BD result provides a strong argument to policymakers who 
insist on conditionality in the form of macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural 
reforms when giving aid. Additionally, it provides a better justification for politicians in 
donor countries to increase foreign aid, given the domestic budget pressures they are facing. 
Subsequent research shows, however, that the results of the BD study are sensitive to sample 
selection and may suffer from omitted variable bias. Hansen and Tarp (2000) include 
squared aid and aid-policy terms in the regressions to control for diminishing returns to aid.
3 
Using an instrumental variables approach, they can replicate the BD results for their reduced 
sample, but if outliers removed by BD are included, the aid-policy-growth link becomes 
insignificant. Aid effectiveness is independent of policy. Hansen and Tarp (2001) are 
concerned about the presence of country-fixed effects and their persistent correlation with 
macroeconomic policy indicators, both of which would render the BD analysis invalid.
4 They 
suggest using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which takes care of country fixed effects 
by first-differencing and includes lagged endogenous variables as instruments to deal with 
endogeneity. Using this estimator, the authors find that aid exhibits diminishing returns with 
respect to growth. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) argue that inclusion of shocks to 
exogenous factors like terms of trade and climate into the analysis of aid effectiveness is 
essential.
5 The omission of these factors in the BD analysis may have lead to overstating the 
importance of policy. The authors suggest that one of the motivations for giving aid is to 
smooth the effects of negative shocks (for example, a drought) in the recipient country. In 
their 2SLS specification, the authors find that policy doesn’t influence the aid effectiveness, 
whereas aid is significantly more effective in countries more vulnerable to shocks. 
Furthermore, growth rates in countries less vulnerable to shocks are generally higher. 
Contrastingly, Collier and Dehn (2001) lend support to the BD result by showing that the 
inclusion of export price shocks into the regression makes their results more robust. 
Additionally, they find that an aid increase in the presence of a negative export price shock 
                                                      
3 See Lensink and White (1999), Hadjimichael et al. (1995), and Durbarry et al. (1998) for different theoretical arguments 
for the non-linear effect of aid on growth.  
4 See Easterly and Levine (1997) and Temple (1998). 
5 The external factors included are trends in terms of trade, stability of agricultural value added and of real value of exports. Revised: August 2005 
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leads to a higher growth rate. Easterly et al. (2003) extend the original BD data set and show 
that their regression result of aid effectiveness in a good policy environment is sensitive to 
sample period and sample countries, the inclusion of outliers, and alternative definitions of 
aid and good policies. In another variation of aid-growth regressions, Dalgaard et al. (2004) 
include the exogenous factor climate represented by the fraction of land in the tropics as 
well as an interaction term for aid and climate. They argue that this variable picks up 
differences in productivity and it also exerts influence on the evolution of institutions. Using 
OLS and 2SLS as well as Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond GMM estimators, the authors 
find that, in general, aid is effective in promoting growth, but it is less effective the larger the 
fraction of land in tropical climate is.
6 Unlike the aid-climate interaction term, the 
significance of the aid-policy interaction term is not robust to specification choice. A recent 
paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) re-examine the cross-country evidence of the 
effects of aid on growth. The authors find little evidence of a link between the amount of aid 
inflows and subsequent economic growth, whether negative or positive. They test the 
robustness of the aid-growth relationship using different lags of aid, different time frames, 
multi- and bilateral aid, types of aid, short- and long-term impact of aid, different samples, 
and cross-section and panel specifications. The evidence of aid effectiveness is described as 
weak, whether the aid variable is interacted with a policy variable or not. The overall 
conclusion from this literature is that several aspects of the aid-growth relationship need to 
be further investigated to reach conclusive results. First, a better theoretical understanding of 
the determinants of aid allocation and its links to growth will help in deciding on 
specification and which explanatory variables to include in regression analysis. Second, the 
channels through which aid influences growth have to be more closely examined. For 
example, Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) offer an explanation how aid can hurt growth 
instead of improving it. Increased aid inflows can lead to overvalued exchange rates, which 
then lead to a loss of competitiveness in the traded sector of a developing nation. As a 
consequence, this loss of competitiveness retards growth in the overall economy, since the 
(more innovative) traded-goods sector is the main driving force of growth in the economy. 
Their empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. In this context, aid dependence is also an 
                                                      
6 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for a detailed description of the estimation technique. Revised: August 2005 
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under-researched area. Huge aid inflows create disincentives for developing country 
governments in terms of revenue collection. This will undermine otherwise sound 
macroeconomic policies in the long run.  
One promising way to ameliorate the distortions created by aid dependence – at least in the 
case of severely indebted countries – is to think about debt and the consequences of debt 
relief. This brings us to a much related strand of literature that focuses on the link between 
debt and growth. A prominent example in this area is the debt overhang theory. The concept of 
debt overhang is defined as the “presence of an existing 'inherited' debt sufficiently large that 
creditors do not expect with confidence to be fully repaid”.
7 Krugman (1988) and Sachs 
(1986) argue that in this situation the high stock of debt acts like a high marginal tax on 
investment. They suggest that the incentives for domestic firms or the debtor government to 
invest at home are distorted since any positive returns from investment projects are used for 
debt payments. Hence, the net present value of repayments increases. Anticipating this, 
however, economically sensible investment projects will be forgone, thus harming the long-
term economic growth rate of the debtor country. Conceptually this idea is incorporated into 
the debt Laffer curve, which is represented by an “inverted U” relationship between the level of 
debt stock and expected net present value (NPV) of debt service payments. Debt overhang 
in this context means that a country is to the right of the peak of this curve. In this scenario, 
a decrease in debt stock (through debt relief) increases the expected NPV of repayments. 
Hence, from a creditor country’s perspective, this theory provides an economic rationale for 
debt relief if the debtor suffers from debt overhang.
8  
In an empirical study, Pattillo et al. (2002) find evidence of debt overhang. Using a panel 
data set comprised of 93 developing countries for the period 1969-1998, they suggest that at 
a debt stock of 35-40 percent of GDP, the average effect of debt on per capita growth 
becomes negative. Clements et al. (2003) confirm their results of a debt overhang. 
Furthermore, they find that debt service has a “crowding out” effect on public investment, 
                                                      
7 See Krugman (1988), p.254. 
8 Other justifications include the concept of odious debt, humanitarian concerns, political considerations (Iraq debt relief), 
and many others. Revised: August 2005 
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thereby lowering the overall growth rate of a developing country. They argue that if 
resources freed up by debt service relief can be directed towards public investment, growth 
rates in some HIPC countries would increase by half a percentage point annually. Similarly, 
Chowdhury (2001) finds evidence for debt overhang in his sample. He uses extreme bounds 
analysis to compare HIPC countries with other moderately to severely indebted countries. 
The main focus of his paper is whether the set of countries eligible for HIPC debt relief 
should be extended. He finds that debt stock and debt service have a negative effect on 
growth rates in both country groups; this suggests that debt overhang is present and that 
debt relief could potentially beneficial consequences for countries currently excluded from 
the HIPC initiative.  
However, there is disagreement about the existence or importance of debt overhang and the 
debt Laffer curve. For example, Bird and Milne (2003) question the presence of a debt 
overhang problem in low-income countries. Official resource transfers to highly indebted 
countries often exceed their debt service payments. Hence, incentives for domestic 
investment may not be distorted for after all. Furthermore, they caution that providing 
(unconditional) debt relief to highly indebted countries may simply redistribute resources to 
countries with a history of unsound macroeconomic policies. Hence, “bad policies” in the 
past would be rewarded ex-post by providing debt relief. In the theoretical literature, there 
are several papers questioning the conventionally held view that an excessive level of 
sovereign debt has distortionary incentive effects on the behavior of economic agents in the 
indebted country [Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989), Cordella et al. (2002), Kletzer and Wright 
(2000)]. For example, Kletzer and Wright (2000) make the point that a renegotiation proof 
constrained efficient perfect equilibrium implies irrelevance of debt overhang. Debt up to a 
country’s maximum “willingness to pay” is relevant; however, debt beyond that point, i.e., 
the classical debt overhang, is irrelevant. An important point directly relevant for this paper 
is made by Cordella et al. (2002). In contrast to the conventional theoretical literature, where 
only the present value of debt (stock) matters, the authors argue that only debt service matters. 
In their model, debt service relief can raise welfare whereas debt stock does not.  
Another (altruistic) rationale for debt relief – particularly in the context of the HIPC debt 
initiative – is to provide a debtor country with additional resources for poverty reduction. 
Funds otherwise used for debt service payments are “freed up” by providing debt relief and Revised: August 2005 
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can then be used for education or public health expenditures. A concern that naturally arises 
in this context is aid fungibility, i.e., are the resources freed by debt relief (which may be 
considered as an indirect form of aid) used as intended by the creditor/donor. A detailed 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Let me now turn to the 




3  Empirical Model 
Before going into details about the setup of my regression analysis, let me give a brief 
overview of the issues addressed in the empirical exercise. The main question being 
addressed in this empirical analysis is whether debt relief measures in the last two decades 
positively influenced growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. First, I 
investigate the impact of debt relief on growth rates for low-income and lower and upper 
middle-income countries. Second, I divide the sample into two groups: The first group 
includes only countries classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries; the second group 
consists of the remaining developing countries in the sample. As we saw in the previous 
section, there are numerous studies investigating the link between aid, policies, and growth 
rates. This study is – to the best of my knowledge – the first one that incorporates debt relief 
into the aid effectiveness framework and explicitly compares HIPC and non-HIPC countries 
in terms of aid and debt relief effectiveness. Essential to this empirical analysis is the 
definition of the debt relief variable(s). I use two different sets of variables to represent debt 
relief. The debt relief variables – derived from World Bank data – are called debt service relief 
and debt stock relief. The alternative definition of debt relief (OECD debt relief ) used in the 
analysis – derived from the OECD’s International Development Statistics data set – is 
somewhat problematic due to different reporting practices among creditor countries.
9 
Neither alternative precisely captures the definition of debt relief in the theoretical literature, 
                                                      
9 A more detailed description and discussion of the debt relief variables can be found in the next section. Revised: August 2005 
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where debt (stock or service) relief is defined as the change in net present value of debt 
(stock or service, respectively). However, the variables derived from World Bank data come 
closer to the theoretical measure(s) and are therefore preferred.  
To empirically address debt relief and aid effectiveness with respect to growth, I use a 
specification that is fairly standard in the literature: 
''
0 it it x it z i t it yX Z α βγ α φ ε =+ + ++ +  
where  it y  is the growth rate of GDP per capita;  it X  is a vector of the variables of interest, 
it Z  is a vector of control variables;  i α  is a country fixed effect;  t φ  is a year dummy; and  it ε is 
an i.i.d. error term.  
The variables of interest included in  it X  are aid, squared aid, debt stock, debt service, interacted 
variables  * aid policy, 
2 * aid policy, and – the main variable(s) of interest – debt relief. The 
inclusion of debt relief into this framework is – a mention before – the main innovation of 
this paper. There are main two channels through which debt relief may be enhancing 
growth: either by providing additional resources for public investment or – if debt relief is 
substantial enough – by removing the distortion caused by a debt overhang. 
The other variables of interest included in the regression have previously been used in the 
literature. Like debt relief, foreign aid is assumed to be growth enhancing by providing 
additional resources for public investments that would otherwise not be undertaken due to a 
lack thereof. The squared aid term is included to control for diminishing returns to aid. As 
previously mentioned, diminishing returns can be a consequence of aid dependence, i.e., a 
government may relax its efforts for revenue collection in the presents of persistent and 
large aid inflows. Debt stock and debt service – at least when they are at very high levels – 
may hinder growth through distortions of private and public investment incentives. The 
policy term in the interacted aid-policy terms is similar to Burnside and Dollar (2000). Unlike 
in BD and some other papers, the policy term is constructed as an equally weighted average 
of the inflation rate, the budget balance, and of trade openness which is measured as exports Revised: August 2005 
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as a percentage of GDP.
10 The coefficient estimates for the interacted aid-policy terms tell us 
whether aid is more effect in a good policy environment – the main result of BD. 
Following the literature, I include a set of control variables ( it Z ) into the regressions. The 
lagged value of per capita GDP is included to control for conditional convergence of growth 
rates. M2/GDP, lagged one period, is used as a proxy for financial depth. Following Easterly 
and Levine (1997), I also include ethno-linguistic fractionalization as a proxy to account for cross-
country differences in public policies; for example, insufficient infrastructure in areas 
inhabited by ethnic minorities. The measure for institutional quality is similar to that of Knack 
and Keefer (1995) and consists of the sum of three equally weighted measures - bureaucratic 
quality, rule of law, and corruption – where a higher value indicates better institutional 
quality. Political stability is derived from two index variables measuring internal and external 
conflict. Again, a higher index indicates a more stable country. The variable restrictions on 
freedom is the sum of indices measuring political rights and civil liberties where a higher index 
means a lower degree of freedom. This variable is used as a proxy for the political system 
and the degree of a democratic process. Following Dalgaard et al. (2004), I include a variable 
called tropics, which measures the percentage of the land area in tropical climate. This 
variable is meant to capture differences in productivity and in the evolution of institutions.  
Unlike most of the previous literature, which averages data with 3 to 5 year averages for a 
more balanced panel, I am using yearly data.  Information contained in the annual data will 
be lost by averaging, especially when we have dramatic changes in the variables of interest 
over short time periods. It is also not clear whether averaging data over a particular time 
span will appropriately deal with the issue of business cycles in a large panel data set; the 
length of business cycles may vary widely across countries as well as over time. The 
regression analysis is performed initially using Ordinary Least Squares with year dummies 
and country fixed effects. As pointed out by Dalgaard et al. (2004) among others, there is a 
problem of biased estimates when using OLS. This bias is caused by the endogeneity of aid 
and policy with respect to growth. For example, donor countries may be rewarding a country 
with a high level of GDP growth with more foreign aid, or they may want to help slow-
                                                      
10 Burnside and Dollar (2000), and other, use the Sachs and Werner (1995) trade openness dummy. I use exports (as % of 
GDP) as a proxy for trade openness due to better data availability. Revised: August 2005 
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growing low-income countries with additional aid resources.  When policy is defined as a 
combination of budget surplus, inflation, and trade openness, all of these components can 
potentially be correlated with the growth rate. To deal with the endogeneity of aid and 
policy, I use the “first-difference” and the “system” GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively). Particularly in more recent papers of the 
aid effectiveness literature [Dalgaard et al. (2004), Rajan and Subramanian (2005a)], use of 
these estimators is fairly standard for dynamic panel data sets. Apart from dealing with 
endogeneity, the two GMM estimators also take care of country fixed effects which makes 
them comparable to the fixed effects OLS regression. The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator 
deals with a potential omitted variable bias (and country fixed effects) by first-differencing 
the original regression equations. The first-differenced endogenous variables aid and policy 
are then instrumented with lags of their own levels. Since lagged levels are often poor 
instruments for first differences, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest including the original 
equations to the system, and instrumenting the levels of endogenous variables with lags of 
their own first differences. Additionally, aid is instrumented with population, since the aid 
allocation literature suggests that there is a small-country bias of aid. 
 
 
4  Data 
The entire sample contains data on 122 developing countries that are classified as low-
income, lower middle-income, and upper middle-income countries for the time period 1970-
2001. As mentioned previously, to address the question of whether there are different effects 
of debt relief on different country groups, the entire sample will also be divided into two 
groups: 39 HIPC countries, and 83 Non-HIPC countries. 
Since my main interest lies in the effect of debt relief on growth rates, a clear description of 
my debt relief variable(s) is necessary. Two alternative approaches are taken. In one 
approach, I use debt relief variables derived or taken from the Global Development Finance Revised: August 2005 
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(GDF) 2005 data set. The first variable I take from the data is called debt stock relief.
11 A 
potential economic effect of debt stock relief will be on perceptions of the future. In the 
presence of debt overhang, economically meaningful debt stock relief will bring a debtor 
country back to a sustainable growth path; or in other words, it will remove the disincentives 
for investment created by the debt overhang. Economic agents will increase their 
investments in the debtor country and therefore increase economic growth, since they are 
confident that their return on the investment will not be entirely taxed away to service 
government debt. Focusing on a different aspect of high indebtedness, namely the debt 
service burden, I derive a second variable from the GDF 2005 data set by adding the 
variables  principal forgiven and interest forgiven and call it debt service relief.
12 Especially in 
developing countries, debt service can act as a “burden” in the sense of using government 
revenue for debt repayment rather than for necessary investments in infrastructure, basic 
education, health care, water and sanitation, to name just a few. For example, one of the 
main ideas behind the HIPC initiative – additionality – is addressing exactly this issue. A 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) put together by the debtor government specifies 
exactly how resources that are ‘freed up’ by the HIPC initiative are to be used for 
investments in the sectors described above. Debt service relief should therefore positively 
affect the growth rate: Directly by increasing public investment activity, and indirectly by 
increasing human capital (at least in the long term).  
In the second approach, I use an alternative measure called OECD debt relief taken from the 
OECD International Development Statistics 2004 data set.
13 As has been pointed out by 
Powell (2003), this debt relief variable is not ideal, however. It is reported to the OECD by 
the creditor countries as their ‘cost’ of providing debt relief. The main problem is that 
reporting practices among donors differ significantly. OECD DAC guidelines allow 
                                                      
11 This variable corresponds to the variable “Debt forgiveness or reduction” in World Bank (2005a) and is defined as follows: 
“Debt forgiveness or reduction shows the change in debt stock due to debt forgiveness or reduction. It is derived by subtracting 
debt forgiven and debt stock reduction from debt buyback.” 
12 These variables are described in the data definitions of World Bank (2005a): “Principal forgiven (interest forgiven) is the 
amount of principal (interest) due or in arrears that was written off or forgiven in any given year.” 
13 In the documentation of OECD (2004), this variable is called action related to debt and defined as “debt forgiveness, 
rescheduling, refinancing, etc”. Revised: August 2005 
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members to choose between two options for reporting debt cancellation: The first option is 
to report the commitment and disbursement cancelled in a lump sum; or – as a second 
option – to report the commitment in a lump sum and the disbursements year-by-year, i.e. in 
the year in which payments would have fallen due. Most donors report the total amount of 
debt relief granted in the year the agreement is reached. A few countries spread the cost of 
debt relief over the lifetime of the loan, instead.
14 The OECD variable may therefore be 
more appropriate in investigating long-term effects on growth. Also, the data cannot be 
divided into a debt service and debt stock component. Empirical results reached with this 
variable therefore have to be interpreted with caution. To summarize, neither variable set for 
debt relief is ideal with respect to capturing the conventional theoretical meaning of debt 
relief as a change in net present value terms. The correlations between the alternative debt 
relief variables are very low: OECD debt relief and debt service relief have a correlation 
coefficient of only 0.24; OECD debt relief and debt stock relief have a correlation of 0.40. 
This leads to the conclusion that the variables actually measure quite different things. If the 
argument in Cordella et al. (2002) is correct in arguing that the net present value is irrelevant 
and that flow debt relief can raise the welfare of the poor, the World Bank measures are 
clearly preferable to the OECD data. 
Data on per capita GDP, the growth rate of per capita GDP, the inflation rate, M2, and population 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005. Debt stock, debt service, and 
exports (all three as percentages of GDP) are data are from GDF 2005. The aid variable used 
in this paper is net official development assistance (net ODA) from the OECD International 
Development Statistics (IDS) 2004 data set. Burnside and Dollar (2000) use effective 
development assistance, a data set derive by Chang et al. (1998); Easterly (2003) finds that this 
measure and net ODA are highly correlated, however. Hence, the choice of aid variable in 
this case should only have little influence on the results. The policy variable is constructed as 
an average of trade openness (measured as exports as a percentage of GDP), the inflation 
rate, and the budget balance. Data on the budget balance – which is used for the 
construction of the policy variable – is taken from the International Financial Statistics (May 
2005).   
                                                      
14 See Annex 3 in OECD (2000) for the reporting practices adopted by OECD countries. Revised: August 2005 
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Data on ethno-linguistic homogeneity is the same as the fractionalization variable used in Easterly 
and Levine (1997), and is downloadable from William Easterly’s webpage, originally 
collected in the 1960s by the Soviet Union. Its values are between 0 and 1, where a higher 
value implies less ethnic diversity. The measure for institutional quality is similar to that of 
Knack and Keefer (1995) and consists of the sum of three equally weighted measures - 
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption – all taken from the International Country Risk 
Guide. The measure for political stability is taken from the same data set, and consists of the 
sum internal and external conflict, an index going from 2 to 14. The variable freedom is the 
average of the measures for political rights and civil liberties from the Freedom House World 
Country Ratings 2004. Finally, the variable describing the percentage of land area in the tropics 
is from Strahler and Strahler (1992).  
Before discussing the regression results in the next section, I should note that debt relief data 
from the World Bank (“Debt Stock Relief” and “Debt Service Relief”) are only available 
from 1990 to 2001. Debt relief data from the OECD is available from 1973 onwards; the 
regressions, however, will only use data from 1984 onwards, since one of the control 
variables – institutional quality – is not available before that date. 
 
 
5  Empirical Analysis 
In this section I briefly comment on the descriptive statistics reported in tables 1a and 1b. 
Furthermore, I describe and interpret the results of the regression analysis. In particular, I 
focus on the main question of interest here: Has debt relief had a positive effect on the GDP 
growth rates of developing countries? The regression results are reported in tables 2a to 3c.  
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
We will first focus on the descriptive statistics reported in tables 1a and 1b for HIPC and 
non-HIPC countries, respectively, to get a better idea about the differences between HIPC 
and non-HIPC countries,  . The data covers the time period 1984 to 2001. It is obvious from Revised: August 2005 
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a casual comparison that similarities are rare and differences quite stark. Starting with gross 
domestic product, we see that HIPC countries have very low average income levels (about 
380 dollar per capita) compared to non-HIPC countries (about 2,500 dollar per capita). The 
same is true for average per capita growth rates. We see that HIPC countries grew much 
slower in the sample period, 0.5 vs. 2.4 percent annual growth. As we would expect, the 
average debt stock for HIPCs was twice as high (with a maximum level of about 740 percent 
of GDP for Nicaragua in 1995, compared to about 230 percent for Jordan in the same year). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the debt service burden is very similar for the two sets of countries 
as a percentage of GDP. This gives little support to the argument that debt service is a major 
inhibitor of social expenditure in HIPC countries. A point that has also been noted in earlier 
studies is the very significant amount of aid received by HIPCs: more than 10 percent of 
GDP! In line with our expectations, HIPCs received significantly more debt relief 
(independent of which measure we focus on). A very interesting observation about the 
components of the policy variable – budget balance, inflation, and trade openness – is that 
HIPC and non-HIPCs differ significantly only with respect to their trade openness with 
non-HIPCs having much greater export volumes. Financial depth as proxied by M2 is 
significantly higher in non-HIPCs, which are also more ethnically diverse and have less area 
in the tropics. 
 
5.2  Measuring Debt Relief with Data from the World Bank  
Before discussing the empirical results, let me mention that all the panel data sets that follow 
are unbalanced due to sometimes severe limitations on data availability. Many studies in the 
aid effectiveness literature have tried to fill gaps in the data by extrapolation, averaging, etc.; 
my preferred strategy, however, is to work with an unbalanced panel data since the 
estimation methods used work also for unbalanced panels  
Let me begin with presenting the regression results for debt relief variables derived from 
World Bank data. For reasons discussed in section 4, these debt relief variables are closer to 
the theoretical definition of debt relief. The empirical results in this part can therefore be 
interpreted more confidently in terms of addressing the research question of this paper. The 
time period considered here is 1990 to 2001 and results for the complete sample of 122 Revised: August 2005 
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developing countries are reported in table 2a. First of all, the debt relief variables for debt stock 
and debt service do not significantly influence growth rates when using the undivided sample. 
Of the other main variables of interest, only debt service has a fairly robust negative effect on 
growth across specifications, particularly when we control for diminishing returns to aid by 
including the squared aid term. A one percent increase in debt service leads to a drop in the 
average annual per capita growth rate of GDP of 0.19 to 0.26 percent depending on the 
specification. In other words, debt service does indeed act as a burden and lowers the 
growth rate possibly by crowding out public investments. The debt stock only shows a 
highly significant effect in the OLS fixed effects regressions, which may be biased, however, 
due to unaccounted for endogeneity of aid and policies. However, the estimates in the other 
specifications do have the expected negative sign. The policy variable is positive and 
significant at the one percent level across all specifications, implying that good policies lead 
to higher growth rates. However, in contrast to Burnside and Dollar (2000), but in line with 
some subsequent studies, my results indicate, that aid effectiveness is independent of the 
policy environment, particularly when I control for diminishing returns of aid [columns (4) 
to (6) in table 2a].
15 Furthermore, foreign aid by itself does not seem to have any significant 
influence on the growth rate of the economy in any specification. Among the control 
variables, the coefficient on political stability is significantly positive in the OLS fixed effects 
and Arellano-Bond regressions. This is expected as a higher indicator for political stability 
implies more stability, which then leads to a higher growth rate of the economy. The 
coefficient of the lagged level of GDP is negative as expected, suggesting conditional 
convergence of growth rates. The coefficient estimate of institutional quality is insignificant, 
which can mean one of two things. Either we have already controlled for the most important 
factors determining institutional quality and hence, institutional quality may still matter; or – 
the more straightforward, but less convincing conclusion – that institutional quality doesn’t 
matter. Lastly, less democratic countries – indicated by a higher index number of restrictions on 
freedom, grow somewhat slower, but the result is not robust.  
                                                      
15 Recalling the Burnside and Dollar results, good policies make aid only more effective when squared aid terms are not 
included. This has been pointed out earlier, for example, by Dalgaard et al. (2004). Revised: August 2005 
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As pointed out earlier, the differences in economic indicators between HIPC and non-HIPC 
countries are fairly substantial. We will see that this is also reflected in the significant 
differences of my regression results. Turning our attention to HIPC countries first [table 2b], 
a fairly bleak picture emerges particularly with respect to the effectiveness of debt relief 
initiatives in promoting growth in the last decade. Neither debt service nor debt stock relief has 
any significant effect on growth rates in this sub-sample of countries. This is disappointing 
from a political perspective since many of the initiatives in the 1990s have focused on these 
very indebted and poor countries. Furthermore, neither the aid terms nor the interacted aid 
terms are statistically significantly different from zero irrespective of estimation method or 
specification. Policies by themselves also do not seem to matter, either. When comparing the 
results on debt service with those for the whole sample, coefficient estimates turn out to be in 
the same ballpark, but significance is much less robust for HIPC countries. In fact, only 
when using the system GMM approach, significant estimates result. Among the control 
variables, the coefficient estimates for restrictions of freedom and for political stability have the 
correct signs are at least weakly significant for most specifications. Even growth rates do not 
seem to converge for HIPC country data.  Overall, these results beg the question: What are 
the determinants on growth in heavily indebted poor countries? Future research will have to 
address this question.  
Finally, the focus turns to countries that are not classified as HIPC. Table 2c reports the 
results of the empirical analysis. Given the extent of debt relief provided to HIPC countries 
compared to non-HIPCs, it is quite surprising to see that debt service relief effectively 
improved growth rates in non-HIPC countries. This may indicate that the additional 
resources were used for socially worthwhile investments rather than being diverted to 
consumption expenditure. A one percent increase in debt service relief leads to a 0.2 % increase 
in the GDP growth rate in the specification including a squared aid term [columns (4)-(6)]. 
Hence, non-HIPC countries have benefited unambiguously in terms of higher growth from 
debt relief and rescheduling initiatives in the 1990s. Debt stock relief, on the other hand, had 
no statistically significant effect on growth. These results lends support to Cordella et al. 
(2002) who suggest that only debt service relief matters, whereas debt stock relief is irrelevant. 
Increasing debt stock and debt service both lower economic growth – with debt service having a 
bigger effect; the coefficient estimates are highly significant. A one percent increase in debt 
service leads to a 0.4 percent drop in growth, while a one percent increase in debt stock  Revised: August 2005 
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reduces growth by “only” 0.025 to 0.090 percent. For non-HIPC countries, policy matters. 
Good policy by itself increases growth as well as enhancing aid effectiveness, thus lending 
some support to the BD results. The coefficient estimates for policy are robust and highly 
significant independent of estimation method and specification. Aid by itself, however, does 
not seem to be beneficial in terms of growth; if anything, aid seems to have a detrimental 
effect on growth rates. One possible explanation could be that increased aid inflows are 
interpreted as a negative signal by private investors, who then decrease their investments 
while public investments are not able to compensate for the decline completely. The 
coefficient estimates for lagged GDP per capita provide empirical support for the 
conditional convergence hypothesis of growth rates among non-HIPC countries. Finally, 
financial depth has a fairly robust positive influence on growth rates. 
 
5.3  Measuring Debt Relief with Data from the OECD 
In this sub-section, I report and discuss the empirical results of the regression specifications 
using debt relief data from the OECD. As discussed in section 4, this measure of debt relief 
is somewhat problematic because of differing reporting practices by creditor countries. 
Furthermore, there is no distinction between debt service and debt stock relief. The measure 
appears to be closer to debt stock than debt service relief, though. The sample covers the 
time period 1984 to 2001. 
Regression results for the complete sample are reported in table 3a. Coefficient estimates for 
OECD debt relief – the main variable of interest – are significant at the 5 percent level and 
positive for the fixed effects OLS and the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, indicating that 
debt relief increased growth rates. In the Blundell-Bond GMM estimation, which deals most 
effectively with endogeneity and is therefore more reliable than the other two 
methodologies, the coefficient estimates for OECD debt relief are markedly smaller and 
insignificant. Debt service and debt stock have the expected negative signs for Blundell-
Bond GMM estimation; the coefficient estimate for debt stock is economically insignificant. 
Interestingly, the aid-policy interaction term is mostly negative (!), but insignificant. Among 
the variables of interest, only policy is fairly robust and positive. Good policy – say a 3 percent Revised: August 2005 
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decrease in the budget deficit - increases the growth rate by up to a tenth of a percent.
16 The 
coefficient estimates of restrictions on freedom have the expected sign, suggesting that more 
democratic countries grow faster. Lagged GDP per capita, on the other hand, does not have 
consistent signs. They are negative for OLS and Arellano-Bond, and positive for Blundell-
Bond, not giving a conclusive result for conditional convergence of growth rates.  
Restricting the sample to HIPC countries, the estimation results with the OECD debt relief 
variable are very similar to those using the World Bank definition, i.e., mostly disappointing 
from a policy standpoint. OECD debt relief is significant in a few specifications, but not 
robustly so. All the other variables of interest are insignificant. Particularly disturbing is the 
fact, that neither aid nor policy nor the interaction between the two seems to matter for 
growth. Furthermore, there is no consistent pattern in the significance of the control 
variables except maybe for lagged GDP per capita. All the coefficient estimates are negative, 
but only significant in half of the specifications.  
Finally, estimation results for countries not classified as HIPC are reported in table 3c. The 
coefficient estimates for OECD debt relief are puzzling. The estimates are significant at the 5 
or 1 percent significance and negative. A one percent increase in debt relief, decrease the 
growth rate by about 0.3 percent. Considering the set of countries we are investigating, the 
explanation for the unexpected sign of the debt relief variable may have to do with their 
access to private capital markets.
17 Receiving debt relief may hamper access to private capital, 
since the debt level of the recipient country may be interpreted as unsustainable. Hence, 
access to private capital will be denied due to doubts about a country’s ability for repayment. 
Focusing next on the debt service burden the estimates indicate that it significantly inhibits 
growth in non-HIPC countries, whereas the effect of debt stock is mostly negative but not 
robustly significant. Furthermore, a good policy environment is growth enhancing; however, 
its effect on aid effectiveness is not clear – when significant, most estimates are positive, in 
specification (5), however, good policy affects aid effectiveness negatively. The coefficient 
estimates on aid are insignificant throughout, suggesting that aid does not have positive 
                                                      
16 Remember that policy is an equally weighted average of budget balance, inflation, and trade openness. Hence, a 3 percent 
change in budget balance, ceteris paribus, increases the policy index variable by 1 percent. 
17 HIPC countries tend to have only very limited or no access to private capital markets. Revised: August 2005 
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effects on growth rates in non-HIPC countries. Among the controls, only lagged GDP has 
fairly robust coefficients indicating growth rate convergence.  
Interpreting OECD debt relief as a signal for the economic situation in a country rather than 
as a direct determinant of growth, debt relief may have significantly improved long-term 
prospects of a HIPC country by removing disincentives on private investment caused by a 
possible debt overhang. On the other hand, debt relief for non-HIPC countries may have 
had negative effects on access to private capital by working as a signal for an unsustainable 
debt situation. Due to the interpretation problems of the exact meaning of OECD debt 
relief, these conclusions should be regarded as very tentative. Further research into this issue 
is required.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigated the effects of debt relief as well as other factors like foreign aid 
and economic policies on growth rates. My sample includes 122 low-income, lower middle-
income, and upper middle-income developing countries. Contrary to the Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) study, I find that aid effectiveness is independent of the policy environment, 
which seems to be particularly true for HIPC countries. This may be indicative of possible 
aid dependence in HIPC countries, where aid amounts to around 10 percent of GDP on 
average. My main variable of interest, however, is debt relief. Debt relief is measured with 
two different variables, one from World Bank data, and one from OECD data. To 
investigate the effects of debt relief on different groups of countries, I analyze the effects for 
HIPC and non-HIPC countries separately. Using the World Bank debt relief variables, I find 
that debt service relief for non-HIPC countries had a positive effect on growth. In contrast, 
debt service relief had no effect on the growth rates of HIPC countries. This suggests that 
increasing debt relief has potential to be growth enhancing thereby lift poor countries out of 
poverty. We need to investigate further which factors are responsible for its ineffectiveness 
in HIPC countries. Using the alternative OECD definition of debt relief, I find debt relief 
had positive effects on growth in the complete sample and for HIPC countries separately. 
For non-HIPC countries, however, debt relief appears to have a detrimental effect on Revised: August 2005 
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growth rates. The OECD debt relief measure overstates the amount of actual debt relief (in 
terms of contemporaneous debt service relief) received by a country and may rather be 
considered a proxy for the change in net present value of debt stock.
18 Further research is 
needed to develop better measures for debt relief, but the results of this paper tentatively 
suggest that debt relief is one way to increase growth rates in poor countries.  
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Table 1a  Descriptive Statistics, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
GDP per capita 474 376.87 286.55 74.74 1,339.84
GDP Growth per capita 501 0.52 5.70 -28.20 25.16
Debt Stock*  486 82.81 77.77 0.90 738.26
Debt Service* 486 4.33 4.00 0.03 35.57
Debt Stock Relief* 220 2.12 6.75 0.00 73.02
Debt Service Relief* 220 1.30 7.58 0.00 92.47
Aid* 486 11.37 9.59 0.58 95.00
OECD Debt Relief* 310 1.14 4.22 0.00 67.65
Trade Openness 513 20.87 13.14 0.42 80.31
Budget Balance* 526 -3.74 4.46 -41.22 5.76
Inflation Rate 464 19.00 45.78 -13.99 547.53
Financial Depth* 498 19.93 8.76 0.46 48.23
Ethnolinguistic
Heterogeneity 509 0.59 0.29 0.04 0.90
Land Area in Tropics 526 0.56 0.34 0.00 1.00
Notes: * = in % of GDP. 
Trade openness is measured as "exports as a percentage of GDP".  Ethnolinguistic Heterogeneity is 
the probability that two people in a country picked at random belong to the same ethnic group. Financial 
Depth is measured as M2/GDP.   Revised: August 2005 
 
28
Table 1b  Descriptive Statistics, non-HIPC developing countries 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
GDP per capita 1468 2,510.69 2,365.11 138.97 12,068.38
GDP Growth per capita 1461 2.37 5.23 -19.06 34.77
Debt Stock*  1336 43.09 29.70 0.00 231.50
Debt Service* 1336 5.08 3.82 0.00 26.45
Debt Stock Relief* 579 0.20 1.50 0.00 30.35
Debt Service Relief* 581 0.26 1.23 0.00 12.18
Aid* 1357 3.94 5.64 -0.45 43.30
OECD Debt Relief* 481 0.20 0.84 0.00 14.49
Trade Openness 1437 33.10 20.67 2.90 121.31
Budget Balance* 1500 -3.35 4.72 -31.63 22.63
Inflation Rate 1414 16.91 33.16 -12.43 432.83
Financial Depth* 1361 37.43 25.27 3.56 181.09
Ethnolinguistic
Heterogeneity 1182 0.36 0.27 0.01 0.89
Land Area in Tropics 1298 0.40 0.44 0.00 1.00
Notes: * = in % of GDP. 
Trade openness is measured as "exports as a percentage of GDP".  Ethnolinguistic Heterogeneity is 
the probability that two people in a country picked at random belong to the same ethnic group. Financial 
Depth is measured as M2/GDP.   Revised: August 2005 
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Table 2a  All developing countries, World Bank debt relief variables 
 










Debt Service Relief 0.034 -0.022 -0.007 0.036 0.048 0.027
(0.044) (0.083) (0.051) (0.044) (0.030) (0.028)
Debt Stock Relief  -0.011 0.025 0.028 -0.014 -0.01 0.029
(0.041) (0.027) (0.034) (0.041) (0.019) (0.025)
Debt Service  -0.228*** -0.216 -0.189* -0.237*** -0.244* -0.259***
(0.082) (0.142) (0.105) (0.084) (0.132) (0.073)
Debt Stock -0.016*** -0.007 -0.008* -0.017*** -0.011 -0.006
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Aid -0.022 0.042 0.018 -0.175 -0.227 -0.139
(0.064) (0.088) (0.062) (0.145) (0.243) (0.175)
Aid squared 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Aid * Policy -0.003*** -0.004 0.011* 0.005 -0.001 0.011
(0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
Aid squared * Policy 000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Policy Index 0.083*** 0.123*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.089*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023) (0.012)
Institutional Quality 0.378 -0.647 0.185 0.3 -0.105 -0.277
(0.450) (1.128) (0.658) (0.452) (0.786) (0.580)
Financial Depth, t-1 0.004 0.177** 0.01 0.008 0.095* 0.01
(0.033) (0.076) (0.019) (0.033) (0.051) (0.013)
GDP per capita, t-1 -14.618*** -31.995*** -0.154 -14.065*** -22.225*** -0.14
(1.815) (10.243) (0.470) (1.842) (6.605) (0.637)
Restrictions on Freedom -0.438 -0.367 -0.567** -0.452 -0.347 -0.564***
(0.288) (0.444) (0.229) (0.288) (0.303) (0.205)
Political Stability 0.251*** 0.379** 0.242 0.242*** 0.280** 0.171
(0.082) (0.163) (0.158) (0.082) (0.138) (0.118)
Land Area in Tropics 1.702 0.119
(1.183) (0.752)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity 0.991 0.78
(1.896) (1.630)
Observations 538 486 538 538 486 538
R-squared 0.25 0.25
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.014 0.001 0.006 0.001
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.430 0.540 0.411 0.439
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  Revised: August 2005 
 
30
Table 2b  HIPC countries, World Bank debt relief variables 
 










Debt Service Relief 0.017 0.013 -0.002 0.018 0.015 -0.006
(0.058) (0.038) (0.043) (0.059) (0.038) (0.045)
Debt Stock Relief  -0.03 -0.031 -0.019 -0.032 -0.033 -0.013
(0.053) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.027) (0.028)
Debt Service  -0.193 -0.151 -0.246** -0.194 -0.16 -0.281**
(0.160) (0.139) (0.112) (0.167) (0.122) (0.105)
Debt Stock -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)
Aid 0.107 0.097 0.183** 0.005 -0.036 0.126
(0.102) (0.082) (0.063) (0.252) (0.244) (0.219)
Aid squared 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Aid * Policy 0 0 -0.001 0.003 0.01 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Aid squared * Policy 000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Policy Index 0.029 0.027 0.066** 0.015 -0.018 -0.002
(0.037) (0.018) (0.027) (0.072) (0.063) (0.054)
Institutional Quality -0.963 -0.942 0.262 -1.034 -1.093 0.475
(1.294) (1.526) (0.789) (1.321) (1.598) (0.849)
Financial Depth, t-1 0.032 0.033 0.017 0.029 0.024 0.013
(0.103) (0.074) (0.042) (0.106) (0.075) (0.039)
GDP per capita, t-1 -6.719* -5.754 0.866 -6.105 -5.165 0.707
(3.673) (5.442) (0.824) (3.961) (6.335) (0.668)
Restrictions on Freedom -1.167* -1.169 -1.004** -1.176* -1.181 -1.095**
(0.654) (1.160) (0.444) (0.664) (1.153) (0.493)
Political Stability 0.294* 0.287* 0.171 0.294* 0.286* 0.12
(0.174) (0.137) (0.128) (0.176) (0.135) (0.127)
Land Area in Tropics 1.021 1.702
(1.555) (1.405)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity 2.274 2.333
(1.520) (1.551)
Observations 156 139 156 156 139 156
R-squared 0.24 0.24
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.033
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.953 0.945 0.939 0.989
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  Revised: August 2005 
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Table 2c  Non-HIPC developing countries, World Bank debt relief variables 
 










Debt Service Relief 0.203* 0.124 0.098 0.200* 0.200*** 0.158***
(0.104) (0.077) (0.083) (0.106) (0.058) (0.036)
Debt Stock Relief  0.198 0.327* 0.244 0.194 0.203 0.257
(0.136) (0.182) (0.247) (0.137) (0.147) (0.181)
Debt Service  -0.368*** -0.481** -0.238* -0.370*** -0.397*** -0.238***
(0.102) (0.223) (0.120) (0.103) (0.142) (0.079)
Debt Stock -0.073*** -0.090*** -0.025** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.028***
(0.015) (0.032) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010)
Aid -0.241** -0.219 -0.317*** -0.217 -0.193 -0.233
(0.102) (0.147) (0.067) (0.270) (0.384) (0.196)
Aid squared -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Aid * Policy 0.026*** 0.025** 0.019** 0.030* 0.026 0.031**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012)
Aid squared * Policy 0 0 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Policy Index 0.056*** 0.056** 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.057** 0.064***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.024) (0.012)
Institutional Quality -0.106 -0.831 -0.079 -0.127 -0.113 0.768*
(0.458) (0.591) (0.529) (0.464) (0.435) (0.404)
Financial Depth, t-1 0.081** 0.113** 0.011 0.082** 0.074* 0.006
(0.036) (0.051) (0.014) (0.037) (0.043) (0.009)
GDP per capita, t-1 -17.800*** -29.152*** -0.432 -17.673*** -18.479*** -0.21
(2.354) (6.831) (0.469) (2.408) (3.396) (0.474)
Restrictions on Freedom -0.395 -0.62 -0.2 -0.387 -0.404 0.055
(0.323) (0.400) (0.254) (0.324) (0.282) (0.203)
Political Stability 0.149 0.282 0 0.149 0.161 -0.001
(0.093) (0.172) (0.125) (0.094) (0.114) (0.098)
Land Area in Tropics -0.264 0.161
(0.522) (0.505)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity -0.118 0.268
(1.143) (0.920)
Observations 382 347 382 382 347 382
R-squared 0.42 0.42
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.004
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.768 0.666 0.838 0.743
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  Revised: August 2005 
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Table 3a  All developing countries, OECD debt relief variable 
 










OECD Debt Relief  0.140** 0.133*** 0.074 0.135** 0.107** 0.054
(0.057) (0.039) (0.047) (0.058) (0.042) (0.046)
Debt Service  -0.159 0.104 -0.167* -0.157 0.002 -0.198***
(0.108) (0.187) (0.091) (0.108) (0.188) (0.070)
Debt Stock -0.01 -0.006 -0.007** -0.01 -0.007 -0.008**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Aid 0.075 0.126 0.168*** 0.089 0.241 0.098
(0.067) (0.078) (0.039) (0.151) (0.180) (0.108)
Aid squared 0 -0.004 0
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Aid * Policy -0.002** 0 0 -0.008 -0.028 -0.006
(0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005)
Aid squared * Policy 0 0.001* 0
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Policy Index 0.077*** 0.055 0.064*** 0.096*** 0.159** 0.084***
(0.017) (0.044) (0.020) (0.023) (0.068) (0.020)
Institutional Quality 0.755 1.577 0.283 0.8 0.981 0.358
(0.508) (0.990) (0.361) (0.512) (0.941) (0.390)
Financial Depth, t-1 -0.016 0.025 0.016 -0.008 0.035 0.01
(0.035) (0.080) (0.014) (0.036) (0.069) (0.010)
GDP per capita, t-1 -7.853*** -21.438*** 0.932*** -8.138*** -18.935*** 0.668
(1.671) (6.464) (0.335) (1.704) (6.614) (0.440)
Restrictions on Freedom -0.599** -0.125 -0.404** -0.599** -0.167 -0.475**
(0.292) (0.403) (0.195) (0.293) (0.374) (0.189)
Political Stability 0.168** -0.14 0.027 0.165** -0.067 -0.011
(0.083) (0.148) (0.090) (0.083) (0.137) (0.081)
Land Area in Tropics -0.107 0.159
(1.111) (0.833)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity 0.494 0.244
(1.535) (1.175)
Observations 444 329 444 444 329 444
R-squared 0.2 0.2
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.012
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.883 0.834 0.721 0.912
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  Revised: August 2005 
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Table 3b  HIPC countries, OECD debt relief variable 
 










OECD Debt Relief  0.133* 0.110*** 0.065 0.122 0.098** 0.06
(0.075) (0.037) (0.044) (0.076) (0.039) (0.050)
Debt Service  0.053 0.342*** 0.04 0.103 0.372*** 0.052
(0.172) (0.097) (0.075) (0.175) (0.111) (0.078)
Debt Stock 0 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
Aid 0.052 0.087 0.075 0.136 0.401 0.158
(0.098) (0.100) (0.060) (0.234) (0.292) (0.227)
Aid squared -0.002 -0.008 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Aid * Policy 0.001 0.001 0 -0.018 -0.014 -0.002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (0.030) (0.007)
Aid squared * Policy 0 0.001 0
0.000 (0.001) (0.000)
Policy Index 0.015 0.022 0.042 0.116 0.085 0.051
(0.032) (0.042) (0.025) (0.077) (0.138) (0.040)
Institutional Quality 1.058 1.501 0.952 1.107 1.323 0.855
(1.005) (1.478) (0.593) (1.006) (1.487) (0.600)
Financial Depth, t-1 0.037 -0.018 0.032 0.064 -0.019 0.034
(0.071) (0.057) (0.040) (0.074) (0.045) (0.038)
GDP per capita, t-1 -5.623 -16.880*** -0.446 -7.271* -18.275** -0.429
(3.554) (5.585) (0.905) (3.897) (6.706) (0.899)
Restrictions on Freedom -0.747 0.21 -0.881** -0.744 0.223 -0.856**
(0.623) (0.786) (0.319) (0.623) (0.702) (0.339)
Political Stability 0.055 -0.319 -0.066 0.068 -0.322 -0.059
(0.161) (0.200) (0.112) (0.161) (0.206) (0.109)
Land Area in Tropics -0.326 -0.203
(1.694) (1.862)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity 2.190* 2.157*
(1.084) (1.067)
Observations 176 146 176 176 146 176
R-squared 0.22 0.23
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.034 0.052 0.027 0.052
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.664 0.712 0.847 0.731
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  Revised: August 2005 
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Table 3c  Non-HIPC developing countries, OECD debt relief variable 
 










OECD Debt Relief  -0.232 -0.341*** -0.322*** -0.332 -0.273** -0.363***
(0.240) (0.116) (0.085) (0.254) (0.103) (0.105)
Debt Service  -0.439*** -0.431** -0.499*** -0.474*** -0.350** -0.448***
(0.160) (0.164) (0.115) (0.164) (0.163) (0.113)
Debt Stock -0.029* -0.053* 0.011 -0.022 -0.055** 0.015
(0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018)
Aid -0.043 0.21 0.079 -0.262 -0.357 -0.338
(0.177) (0.206) (0.092) (0.422) (0.503) (0.264)
Aid squared 0.025 0.031 0.032
(0.031) (0.025) (0.020)
Aid * Policy 0.019* -0.009 -0.002 0.043** -0.062* 0.048***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.034) (0.011)
Aid squared * Policy -0.002 0.002 -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Policy Index 0.094*** 0.128** 0.097*** 0.079*** 0.188*** 0.067***
(0.022) (0.046) (0.023) (0.024) (0.062) (0.019)
Institutional Quality 0.102 -0.215 1.055* -0.033 0.116 1.013**
(0.591) (0.652) (0.598) (0.616) (0.559) (0.477)
Financial Depth, t-1 0.025 0.207** -0.001 0.028 0.207*** -0.028
(0.042) (0.080) (0.031) (0.043) (0.073) (0.019)
GDP per capita, t-1 -8.073*** -29.976*** 0.76 -7.635*** -31.035*** -0.024
(2.051) (7.183) (0.722) (2.101) (6.690) (0.670)
Restrictions on Freedom -0.880** -0.711 0.188 -0.849** -0.734 0.267
(0.340) (0.479) (0.337) (0.344) (0.453) (0.285)
Political Stability 0.092 0.086 0.066 0.106 0.047 0.108
(0.101) (0.122) (0.081) (0.102) (0.113) (0.086)
Land Area in Tropics 1.102 0.662
(1.140) (0.834)
Ethnolinguistic Homogeneity 0.226 -1.431
(1.866) (1.480)
Observations 268 183 268 268 183 268
R-squared 0.37 0.38
p values for 
Hansen Test of overid. Restrictions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) in first differences 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.004
Arellano-Bond AR(2) in first differences 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.053
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions 
include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial
depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.
In the GMM regressions, policy, aid, and aid squared  are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, 
and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by
the natural logarithm of population.  